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Abstract. Slow-running attacks against network applications are often
not easy to detect, as the attackers behave according to the specifica-
tion. The servers of many network applications are not prepared for such
attacks, either due to missing countermeasures or because their default
configurations ignores such attacks. The pressure to secure network ser-
vices against such attacks is shifting more and more from the service
operators to the network operators of the servers under attack. Recent
technologies such as software-defined networking offer the flexibility and
extensibility to analyze and influence network flows without the assis-
tance of the target operator.
Based on our previous work on a network-based mitigation, we have
extended a framework to detect and mitigate slow-running DDoS at-
tacks within the network infrastructure, but without requiring access to
servers under attack. We developed and evaluated several identification
schemes to identify attackers in the network solely based on network traf-
fic information. We showed that by measuring the packet rate and the
uniformity of the packet distances, a reliable identificator can be built,
given a training period of the deployment network.
Key words: DDoS mitigation, slow-running DDoS attacks, slow HTTP,
network-based mitigation, software-defined networking
1 Introduction
On the Internet, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks represent com-
mon attack mechanisms that aim for the availability of their target. For this
purpose, DDoS attackers drain relevant resources of the victims (e.g., network
bandwidth or computing power of a host), eventually rendering their services
unavailable for the users. A key to these attacks is the imbalance between re-
sources invested by the attackers and resourced drained at the targets at the
expense of the victim. Some DDoS mechanisms exploit properties of network
protocols (e.g., SYN flooding during TCP connection establishment or amplifi-
cation attacks with DNS replies), while others rely on excessive traffic generated
by a large number of attacking entities (e.g., by leveraging botnets). Most often,
a combination of both is used.
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Slow-running DDoS attacks represent a specific attack mechanism that takes
advantage of the properties of many connection-oriented, request/response-based
client/server protocols, especially HTTP. Instead of simply flooding the victim,
a malicious client of a slow-running DDoS attack spawns connections to the
target server and tries to keep these connections established as long as possible.
At the same time, the client tries to minimize its own network bandwidth for
those connections. Therefore, the attacker delays the completion of its initial
request by purposefully fragmenting and trickling a valid request with extended
periods of no transmissions. Such slow connections then tie up finite resources
at the victim’s server (e.g., threads for request handling) and eventually hinder
the service availability for legitimate users.
So far, countermeasures against slow-running DDoS attacks have been pri-
marily considered for the actual servers under attack, as we highlight in Section 2.
We argue that this host-based approach is not sufficient in several scenarios and
opt for a network-based approach instead. In particular, a host-based approach
requires appropriate adaptations to the individual server setups and configu-
rations by all of their operators. In a network-based approach, the network of
the target actively provides detection and mitigation capabilities, independent
of the actual victim server. The main contribution of our work is presented in
Section 3, when we adapt our network-based, SDN-assisted DDoS mitigation
framework to mitigate slow-running DDoS attacks. Our framework enables us
to protect arbitrary servers in our network against such attacks, without any
changes to the servers. In Section 4, we evaluate the capabilities of our frame-
work using real-world network traffic. Next, we give an outlook and point to
practical implications when applying network-based mitigation schemes against
slow-running DDoS attacks and summarize our findings in Section 5.
2 Background
Unlike many other DDoS attack variants, slow-running attacks do not rely on
excessive network traffic to bring down a target host. Instead, a number of ten-
tatively valid connections with very low bandwidth are used to drain server
resources over time. For the detection and mitigation of such connections, sus-
picious connection properties must be identified. Because it is very difficult to
distinguish attackers from regular slow clients, the detection of slow DDoS at-
tacks is often challenging.
2.1 Slow DDoS Attacks
Slow DDoS attacks target application-level protocols that rely on a connection-
oriented transport protocol (e.g., TCP) and use client/server-based architec-
tures. As most of these protocols employ a request/response-based message ex-
change pattern, we do only consider this pattern.
Under the premise that a server handles an incoming connection by providing
a dedicated resource (e.g., a request handler thread or process), it is the aim of
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a slow DDoS attack to deplete the pool of available connection resources. Note
that these resources still remain idle most of the time, as the mechanism is
attacking their availability, not their utilization.
General Mechanism Given a generic connection-oriented, request/response-
based application protocol, a client first establishes a connection, then sends (1) a
request with its headers, optionally followed by (2) a request payload. After fully
receiving the request, the server handles the request and replies with a response,
consisting of (3) response headers and potentially (4) a response payload.
In either four of these steps, an attacker can deliberately slow down commu-
nication. While sending the request, the attacker can use very low transmission
bandwidths and introduce artificial delays between sending chunks of data on
the application level. When receiving a response, the attacker can delay and
reduce the speed of the read operations, effectively announcing small receiving
buffers and hence forcing the server to also use low bandwidths.
Apart from this agnostic approach, attackers can also exploit explicit prop-
erties of the application-level protocol to delay transmissions, prevent timeouts,
or render a detection difficult due to valid behavior in line with the protocol
specifications.
Slow DDoS Attacks against HTTP Although slow-running DDoS attacks
work against other protocols such as IMAP, SMTP, or FTP, the HTTP protocol
is the most prominent victim of this attacking scheme yet.
Slow Header HTTP Attack This attack is also known as slowloris [1] and is
the predominant slow HTTP attack. It was successfully used in 2009 against
Iranian government servers [14]. In the slow header HTTP attack, a malicious
client starts with a regular HTTP request line. After that, the client waits a
certain period of time before it sends an additional custom request header (e.g.,
"X-abcd: 1234”). The client then waits another period and repeats the previ-
ous step with another random custom header. According to the specification of
HTTP [3], clients are allowed to add such custom headers. This mechanism does
not only slow down the initial request, in fact, it does not terminate the request
at all. Unless the server applies countermeasures such as maximum request du-
ration time, an ongoing slow request can bind server resources for an arbitrary
period.
Slow Body HTTP Attack This variant is also known as the slow POST attack,
as it relies on the HTTP POST method. This method allows the client to submit
a request entity such as form data or file to be uploaded. While regular behavior
is used for the request header, the attacker either slows down the transmission
of the request entity, or provides a Content-Length which is deliberately larger
than the actual entity. In turn, this requires the server to wait for additional
data. Alternatively, an attacker can use the chunked transfer encoding mode in
order to send arbitrarily slow chunks of a request entity.
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Slow Read HTTP Attack In this variant, the attacker requests a large resource
using a regular HTTP request [10]. Once the server starts to send the HTTP
response entity, the attacker consumes the incoming stream at an extremely
slow rate, which forces the HTTP server to slow down the transmission due
to the small receive buffer resp. full window [11]. This attack requires much
more resources from the attackers as the packets from the server need to be
acknowledged and is therefore less common than the aforementioned attacks.
2.2 Countermeasures against Slow DDoS Attacks
There are commercial vendors claiming that their tools are able to mitigate slow-
running attacks. Unfortunately, these vendors do not publish their mechanisms,
nor are their tools freely available for open, comparative analyses. However, there
are scientific publications in the area of our research that we elaborate on in the
following.
While it is rather easy to detect slow-running connections, it is very difficult
to determine whether these connections are from valid clients with bad network
connections, or from malicious clients that execute an attack. Countermeasures
conducted directly by the server under attack have been receiving the majority
of attention in the literature (e.g., [4, 9, 12]). As server applications terminate
connections on the application layer, host-based mechanisms can take advantage
of protocol-specific properties and metrics to estimate malicious behavior. E.g.,
a webserver can specify limits for the minimum data rate required for a client
when sending an HTTP request. It can also use more aggressive timeout values
for the initial HTTP request lines, subsequent header lines or chunks of HTTP
messages. A drawback of host-based mechanisms is the fact that attack victims
and attack deflectors are the same instances.
We opt for a network-based approach which provides protection for threat-
ened services on a network level. So far, only Hong et al. [5] have suggested
a network-based defense method against Slow HTTP DDoS attacks by using
SDNs. Their method introduces an SDN-based defense application that is trig-
gered by a webserver, but then handles potentially malicious HTTP traffic in-
stead of the webserver. The approach relies on assistance by the webserver under
attack, as the webserver actively initiates the attack check routine and forwards
message fragments to the defense application and requires access to the applica-
tion level payload.
Unlike the method of Hong et al., our approach does not require any active
assistance of the threatened servers. Instead, we only probe the servers in a way
which is transparent to the servers and does not require any modifications to
the services.
2.3 Network-Based Mitigation
Mitigation of DDoS attacks can be achieved at different locations in the net-
work. On the one hand, the target host itself can deploy mitigation mechanisms.
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As previously mentioned, there are host-based mitigation mechanisms against
slow attacks. However, these mechanisms require the administrator of the tar-
get service to become active. Many service operators do not have the resources
or knowledge to mitigate attacks on their end. Therefore, mitigating of DDoS
attacks is often handled by network operators and offered as a service in form
of DDoS Protection Services that become increasingly popular [6].
A differentiation amid network-based mitigation mechanisms can be made
whether the mechanism is transparent for the target host and acts autonomously
or whether the target has to actively request the mitigation from the mitigation
service providers and has to cooperate for the mitigation to be effective. The
aforementioned mechanism by Hong et al. is a network-based mitigation mech-
anism based on SDN against slow HTTP attacks that identifies attackers based
on timeouts. The proposed mechanism relies on the cooperation of the target
host [5].
Fayaz et al. [2] propose Bohatai as an “Flexible and elastic DDoS defense”
tool for SDN, NFV, network-based mitigation system. However, they do not
consider slow attacks.
In prior work, we proposed a network-based mitigation system utilizing SDN.
The system is transparent to the target system and acts autonomously. However,
it is only capable of identifying attackers in flooding attacks [7]. The attack
detection and mitigation mechanism is attack agnostic and can therefore also be
used for slow attacks.
3 Framework
In the following, we describe the attacker model underlying our system. Based
on that, we describe the architecture of the system on a conceptual level followed
by a description of the schemes to identify attackers and the description of our
implementation.
3.1 Attacker Model
The attackers in these scenarios have access to a large number of distributed
network resources (e.g. a bot net). Attackers making use of DDoS attacks are
differing greatly in resources and technical knowledge. We differentiate between
two types of attackers. On the one hand, the simple attacker. The simple attacker
uses tools that are readily available for their attacks and several of those exist for
slow attacks. We also make use of these very tools and the options they provide
to emulate the behavior of this attack type. The second attacker model features a
more sophisticated attacker that knows how the attacks work, understands how
these attacks are usually mitigated, and built their own or made adjustments to
the attacking tool to circumvent detection.
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Fig. 1. Sketch of the framework architecture, as described in full detail in [7]. The
contribution of this work focuses primarily on phase 2, the identification of attackers.
3.2 Architecture
The architecture of the mitigation system is based on our previous work. In [7],
we have introduced our framework and the underlying concepts. We have also
implemented the framework, including identification schemes for flooding at-
tacks. In an evaluation, we have shown the system’s capabilities to mitigate
TLS, HTTP, and SYN flooding attacks measuring detection times, times un-
til the last attacker was blocked, and the overall downtime of the server. The
system has proven to be capable of detecting and mitigating these attacks at
10 Gbps throughput on commodity hardware with few falsely identified clients.
The concept is shown in Figure 1.
We have divided the functionality of our framework in three phases. The
detection phase (1) responsible for detecting an attack, the identification phase
(2) identifying the attackers, and the mitigation phase (3) where the attackers
are excluded from the network. The system is a network-based mitigation system
capable of detecting arbitrary DDoS attacks and mitigating flooding attacks.
In the detection phase (1), the system observes the network to find attackers.
For that, the status of servers that are under protection of the system is mon-
itored. If a server cannot be reached, the system assumes an attack and starts
to analyze the traffic data in the identification phase.
The identification phase (2) for the target system is activated to identify
the attackers. For this, the SDN controller instructs the SDN-enabled switches
upstream of the target to mirror the target’s incoming traffic and to forward it to
a network monitor. The monitor then identifies possible attackers by applying the
different identification schemes and relays this information to the SDN controller.
For flooding attacks, we use a scoring-based identification scheme. Clients are
given a score dependent on the assumed load a packet of that type would inflict
on the target system. For example, an IP packet would give one point, a TLS
client hello 20.
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Lastly, in the mitigation phase (3), the SDN controller instructs the switches
to block further connection attempts by the attackers and terminates the at-
tacker’s open connections to the target by injecting spoofed RST messages to
the target system. This way, the target system recovers faster as it does not
wait for the connections to actually time out. The process is repeated until the
target system is reachable again and the observation phase cannot identify any
additional attackers.
We have chosen an SDN-based architecture as it offers enough flexibility and
extensibility to allow for an extensible system. Using SDN especially helps when
setting up the identification phase and in the mitigation phase when blocking
the attackers.
However, as yet, it is not capable of responding to potential slow attacks
once detected at the targets. Therefore, in this work, we focus on identifying
slow attackers and mitigating these attacks. Our framework does not require
host-based protection methods and does not rely on support by the target host.
For this work, we only make minor, internal adjustments to the original
framework. We focus primarily on the techniques used to classify clients as be-
nign or malicious. One important change concerning the framework is the option
to send RST-flagged TCP packets to the server under attack to deliberately ter-
minate connections opened by attackers. Thus, when an attacker is identified,
the resources occupied at the target can be freed almost instantly without wait-
ing for the very long connection timeout of the server that is the very attack
vector that gets exploited in the first place.
3.3 Identification Schemes
Identification of slow attackers is hindered by several factors. The attacking
clients behave according to specification, the data rate of the attack is low,
and — in case of a highly distributed attack — each client only opens a small
amount of connections. This leads to intrusion detection systems not being able
to successfully distinguish attacks from regular server traffic [13]. Currently,
many servers such as Apache can be configured to mitigate the effect of slow
HTTP attacks by reducing the maximum time a server waits to receive a full
request. However, these changes also block legitimate requests from clients with
slow Internet connections and an attack still has a noticeable impact on the
server’s performance [9]. Moreover, this mitigation technique requires the ad-
ministrator to become active and is therefore not a viable option for our use
case.
Attacks conducted by the most common tools, however, also show common
characteristics in terms of network traffic patterns. Based on this traffic (and ex-
tending on preliminary deliberations [8]), we identified six attacker identification
schemes that we took into account for our evaluation:
Long Connections (LC) A very basic method measures the duration d of connec-
tions and deems very long connections suspicious. This method, however, needs
to wait for the connection to last longer than a certain threshold in the area
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of minutes and, thus, the identification of attackers can take longer than with
other methods. This could also lead to many false positives when the time out
is set too short. This is the closest to the already established mitigation method
of changing the aforementioned server settings.
Low packet rate (LPR) One of the core characteristics of slow attackers is a low
packet rate p as the attackers try to send as little packets as possible while still
keeping the connection open. This scheme alone might also lead to slow regular
clients to be blocked. The packet rate is defined as the amount of packets divided
by the elapsed time since the first packet of the connection.
Packet distance uniformity (PDU) Even time intervals between packets are a
feature that can be observed with scripted attacks. The assumption is that non-
scripted real clients would send with varying packet rates due to the user be-
havior, network utilization, and available processing resources. Especially clients
with bad connections that could be mistaken for attackers by the LPR metric ex-
perience differing packet distances. To reduce load, we only consider the packet
distance for three consecutive packets in a row. The packet distance between
two subsequent packets is defined as the difference between their receiving time
stamps. The PDU is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the
packet distances of three consecutive packets abbreviated as ∆.
Combination of LPR and PDU (LPR-PDU) LPR can reliably detect slow clients
while PDU can reliably detect constant clients while both mechanisms cannot
assess the other trait. Therefore, a combination of both schemes could lead to
better results. Both traits are present in attackers but should not be common
in benign clients. The combination of the two metrics evaluates whether a client
shows two characteristics typically attributed to an attacker. As a combination
scheme, this scheme requires two thresholds p and ∆.
Low mean packet rate (MPR) The mean packet rate p¯ of an attack connection
should be high compared to benign clients and could therefore also be used as
an indicator for an attack.
Low packet rate variance (PRV) The mean packet rate of an attack connection
should be more consistent compared to benign clients because of the periodically
generated traffic for keep alive. Therefore, we also analyze whether the packet
rate variance σ2 can be used as an indicator for attackers.
During our preliminary tests, we have noticed that these schemes (except
for LC) behave differently whether the TCP handshake is taken into account.
Therefore, we evaluate these with and without measuring the handshake packets.
The chosen schemes require very little calculation effort, work solely on the
network layer with therefore comparatively minor privacy implications, and have
very low storage requirements (at max, two values per client need to be stored).
In addition to the aforementioned schemes, we also identify two schemes we
choose not to evaluate further as they do not fulfill our requirements of a light-
weight network-based scheme:
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Incomplete application-layer messages This scheme operates on the same concep-
tual level as the approach of Hong et al. [5] for detecting Slow HTTP attacks.
Benign clients typically do not send incomplete headers on application layer.
However, incomplete headers are an inherent feature of slow attacks. Therefore,
this method helps to identify attackers reliably. However, it relies heavily on
the application layer protocol, a specific detector per protocol and attack type
is necessary. For slow HTTP header attacks, for instance, the identification of
incomplete packets needs to check GET requests for only one end-of-line charac-
ter at the end or compare the Content-length definition with the actual body
length of messages. This identification method is quite resource intensive as deep
packet inspection is necessary and requires access to the application layer of the
connections. In contrast to the other schemes, encrypted communication (e.g.
TLS) cannot be analyzed.
Scoring-based Mechanism A scoring-based system based on our prior work used
to mitigate flooding attacks would rate every connection depending on the load
caused at the target. For example, a scoring system would rate Slow POST
attacks by giving a high score to packets belonging to a POST request. To prevent
non-distributed DoS attacks, the number of connections per single clients can
be considered. Thereby, any additional connection will increase the score which
is assigned to a client. If other methods fail to identify attackers correctly, this
mechanism can at least provide the support for a small subgroup of slow HTTP
attacks (non-distributed attacks). Preliminary tests have shown that this scheme
is very unreliable for slow attacks and is therefore excluded from the evaluation.
3.4 Implementation
The network monitor for the observation phase is based on Bro 2.5-3721, which
provides an easy to extend event-based system. Bro already offers some of the
metrics necessary for the analysis such as the packet rate as built-in functions.
Other metrics such as the packet rate without the TCP handshake have to be
calculated without a built-in function of Bro. This can lead to more processing
effort for these schemes as the built-in functions have been potentially optimized
over the years while the newly added features might be less efficient.
Bro provides an API to the Ryu SDN controller2 called broccoli. As Ryu also
satisfies our other requirements of extensibility, sufficient support of the Open-
Flow protocol and our switches, we choose Ryu in version 4.6 for our prototype.
Attackers for the first attack scenario are simulated with the tools slowloris
0.1.43 for slow header attacks and slowhttptest 1.64 for slow body attacks.
For the second attack scenario, we modify the original slowloris tool and
create a variant with a less predictable behavior, called slowloris-ng5.
1 https://bro.org
2 https://osrg.github.io/ryu/
3 https://github.com/gkbrk/slowloris
4 https://github.com/shekyan/slowhttptest
5 https://github.com/vs-uulm/slowloris-ng
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4 Evaluation
The following chapter presents the evaluation results of the schemes introduced
as part of the mitigation framework. We describe the setup and workloads based
on real-life traffic scenarios. We then present the results and discuss their impli-
cations.
4.1 Setup
Each scheme can be configured with specific parameters, for example, for the
long connection scheme a threshold defines after how many seconds a connection
is considered suspicious. For other schemes, such as low packet rate, the optimal
rate needs to be determined. The optimal values are extracted in Section 4.3 by
testing the behavior of the framework with a one-day traffic pcap, as described
in Section 4.2. The number of suspicious packets per client (number of strikes)
necessary to deem a client an attacker is another parameter under investigation.
Its purpose is to reduce false positives when a benign client sends only one packet
or a very small amount of packets that incidentally fall below the threshold.
However, this should have an impact on the detection time.
4.2 Evaluation Workloads
Table 1. Overview over the data sets used.
start date duration #hosts size
(header only)
SUEE1 2017-11-02 24 h 1634 164 MB
SUEE8 2017-11-05 8 d 8286 1871 MB
ICSI 2004-10-04 20 min 461 677 MB
We use three different evaluation workloads with benign traffic to test the
mitigation system in terms of precision and accuracy (Table 1). All test traces
have been captured as actual live traffic from real deployments and merged with
labeled attack traffic from the three attack tools under investigation.
For one, two recordings from the student union for electrical engineering at
Ulm University6 have been used, one containing 24 hours (2nd to 3th November
2017 with 1,634 clients, SUEE1) and another containing eight days (5th to 13th
November 2017 with 8,286 clients, SUEE8) of traffic data respectively. The web
server of the student union offers information about the union on its main site,
provides public real-time transport information for bus stops in the city which is
used primarily on mobile devices via mobile networks, as well as several external
and internal services.
6 https://fs-et.de
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Additionally, we use a recording of an internal enterprise network of the
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory / International Computer Science In-
stitute (LBNL / ICSI) (from the 4th October 2004 between 10:03 pm and 10:23
pm with 461 clients, in the following called ICSI)7.
All three pcap files contain only header data since the data sets were
anonymized and do not contain application layer payload due to privacy con-
cerns. There have been no attacks reported during the times of recording of
the benign data sets. The data sets serve the following purpose in our analysis:
SUEE1 is used as training data set to determine the best thresholds for each
detection scheme. SUEE8 then is used to determine whether the trained miti-
gation system is capable to mitigate attacks adequately. The ICSI set is used as
an indicator whether the parameters could hold universal value or if training for
a specific network is necessary.
For the first attack scenario, the attacking tools are adapted to allow IP
spoofing to simulate distributed attacks and are left in standard configuration
apart from that. The parameters for slowhttptest are 30 seconds intervals, 8192
bytes for the Content-length header, 10 bytes POST-body length per packet
and one socket per client. Slowloris is also configured to use only one socket per
client. The default configuration is left in place in all other settings, resulting in
a packet interval of 15 seconds.
For the second scenario, slowloris-ng includes several changes compared to
the original slowloris. The additional features implement randomized behavior,
which is configured to send in intervals of 15 seconds with a randomization
interval of 5 seconds and sending the header lines as bursts of single messages per
character. This tool shows how applicable the presented schemes are for highly
improved attackers compared to easily accessible attacking scripts. For each of
these tools, 49 to 50 clients are started simultaneously with different IP addresses
to attack the web server. These attacks are run in parallel with the benign pcaps
presented before. Due to the vast differences between the attacks, we choose
to determine the best thresholds for each of the three attacks separately and
evaluate these thresholds against all attacks.
We have combined the SUEE data sets with the attack recordings. We have
published the data sets with a more detailed description on github8. The MAC
and IP addresses are anonymized, i.e. new addresses are set. Benign clients IP
addresses in the anonymized data sets are moved to the 192.168.0.0/16 block,
while attacking clients are in the 128.10.0.0/16 block.
4.3 Results
The evaluation thresholds are determined by testing the mitigation system with
the SUEE1 data set with induced attacks of each type. The number of strikes for
a detection is set to one. The thresholds are found using the bisection method
7 https://www.icir.org/enterprise-tracing/download.html
8 https://github.com/vs-uulm/2017-SUEE-data-set
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starting with two extreme values that would result in detection of all clients —
benign and attackers — and detection of no clients respectively. The balanced
accuracy is used as quality metric. We have decided to use balanced accuracy
over accuracy, as it takes the unbalance of the data sets into account (only
49 to 50 attackers versus up to 8,286 benign clients). Otherwise, a completely
worthless classifier that classifies everything as benign would result in an ac-
curacy of up to 0.994, while the balanced accuracy would be 0.5, similar to
a coin toss, resulting in a much more accurate indicator. Compared to preci-
sion/recall and receiver operating characteristic (ROC), balanced accuracy has
the advantage of resulting in one clear value, that can be taken as a good es-
timation of the quality of a scheme. Balanced accuracy (BACC) is defined as
BACC = ( TPTP+FN +
TN
TN+FP )· 0.5 with the true positive values TP, false positive
FP, true negative TN, and false negative FN.
Table 2. Overview of the ideal thresholds for each scheme and attack for data set
SUEE1.
Scheme
TCP
handshake
slowloris slowhttptest slowloris-ng
LC N/A d = 2.1e−5s d = 2.1e−5s d = 0.0999727s
LPR
yes p = 0.091756Hz p = 0.01739Hz p = 0.783869Hz
no p = 0.079935Hz p = 0.03806Hz p = 0.77687Hz
PDU
yes ∆ = 5.9e−5s ∆ = 2.5e−5s ∆ = 2.5e−5s
no ∆ = 1.4e−5s ∆ = 0.000631s ∆ = 1e−6s
LPR-PDU
yes
p = 0.091756Hz
∆ = 5.9e−5s
p = 0.01739Hz
∆ = 2.5e−5s
p = 0.783869Hz
∆ = 4.1e−5s
no
p = 0.079935Hz
∆ = 1.4e−5s
p = 0.03806Hz
∆ = 0.000631s
p = 0.77687Hz
∆ = 1e−6s
MPR
yes p¯ = 0.83315Hz p¯ = 0.83315Hz p¯ = 0.83315Hz
no p¯ = 4049Hz p¯ = 21845Hz p¯ = 995Hz
PRV
yes σ2 = 0.028007Hz2 σ2 = 0.028007Hz2 σ2 = 0.028007Hz2
no σ2 = 1332497506Hz2 σ2 = 1332497506Hz2 σ2 = 1332497506Hz2
The thresholds determined by this test can be seen in Table 2. The table
shows, that some schemes are very similar for all attacks (e.g. MPR, PRV; LC for
slowloris and slowhttptest) while other schemes show big differences for different
attacks (e.g. LPR-PDU). MPR and PRV show extreme differences depending on
if the TCP handshake is part of the evaluation or not. The high thresholds when
ignoring the handshake might imply, that these schemes might not be applicable
without the TCP handshake. For LPR-PDU, in addition to the best thresholds
for each attack, we also evaluate the maximum values for each partial scheme
(highlighted in the table in bold).
For every classification scheme, there are two things to consider. On the one
hand, how precise the identification is of each scheme for each attack, measuring
if the attack can be mitigated successfully without too many blocked benign
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Table 3. Evaluation results (first part) dependent on scheme, whether or not TCP
handshake is evaluated, data set, attack (SL: slowloris, SH: slowhttptest, NG: slowloris-
ng) and thresholds; detection time is the mean and standard deviation of the detection
times of the true positives in seconds.
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LC
SUEE8
SL 32 4959 17 3544 0.535 t¯ = 0.84 σ = 1.35
SH 49 4959 0 3544 0.708 t¯ = 12.86 σ = 8.81
NG 50 8502 0 1 0.5 t¯ = 0.12 σ = 0.59
ICSI
SL 32 19 17 544 0.81 t¯ = 0.85 σ = 1.35
SH 49 19 0 544 0.983 t¯ = 12.86 σ = 8.81
NG 50 562 0 1 0.501 t¯ = 0.12 σ = 0.59
MPR
N
SUEE8
SL 49 7690 0 813 0.548 t¯ = 2.61 σ = 5.10
SH 49 7690 0 813 0.548 t¯ = 24.34 σ = 37.56
NG 50 7690 0 813 0.548 t¯ = 4.39 σ = 6.68
ICSI
SL 49 532 0 31 0.528 t¯ = 2.61 σ = 5.10
SH 49 532 0 31 0.528 t¯ = 24.33 σ = 37.56
NG 50 532 0 31 0.528 t¯ = 4.39 σ = 6.68
Y
SUEE8
SL 19 611 30 7892 0.658 t¯ = 71.81 σ = 42.96
SH 49 611 0 7892 0.964 t¯ = 108.73 σ = 52.65
NG 14 611 36 7892 0.604 t¯ = 106.34 σ = 85.91
ICSI
SL 19 153 30 410 0.558 t¯ = 71.81 σ = 42.96
SH 49 153 0 410 0.864 t¯ = 108.73 σ = 52.65
NG 14 153 36 410 0.504 t¯ = 106.34 σ = 85.91
PRV
N
SUEE8
SL 49 7691 0 812 0.548 t¯ = 1.07 σ = 1.36
SH 49 7691 0 812 0.548 t¯ = 20.58 σ = 38.77
NG 50 7691 0 812 0.548 t¯ = 1.60 σ = 1.50
ICSI
SL 49 520 0 43 0.538 t¯ = 1.07 σ = 1.36
SH 49 520 0 43 0.538 t¯ = 20.58 σ = 38.77
NG 50 520 0 43 0.538 t¯ = 1.60 σ = 1.50
Y
SUEE8
SL 24 1431 25 7072 0.661 t¯ = 1.46 σ = 1.19
SH 49 1431 0 7072 0.916 t¯ = 82.18 σ = 44.05
NG 13 1431 37 7072 0.546 t¯ = 2.00 σ = 0.00
ICSI
SL 24 70 25 493 0.683 t¯ = 1.46 σ = 1.19
SH 49 70 0 493 0.938 t¯ = 82.18 σ = 44.05
NG 13 70 37 493 0.568 t¯ = 2.00 σ = 0.00
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Table 4. Evaluation results (second part) dependent on scheme, whether or not TCP
handshake is evaluated, data set, attack (SL: slowloris, SH: slowhttptest, NG: slowloris-
ng) and thresholds; detection time is the mean and standard deviation of the detection
times of the true positives in seconds.
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LPR
N
SUEE8
SL 49 641 0 7862 0.962 t¯ = 211.26 σ = 28.65
SH 49 403 0 8100 0.976 t¯ = 210.21 σ = 28.65
NG 50 3853 0 4650 0.773 t¯ = 52.87 σ = 51.39
ICSI
SL 49 165 0 398 0.853 t¯ = 211.25 σ = 28.65
SH 49 107 0 456 0.905 t¯ = 210.21 σ = 0.01
NG 50 336 0 227 0.702 t¯ = 52.87 σ = 51.39
Y
SUEE8
SL 49 1019 0 7484 0.94 t¯ = 174.83 σ = 34.78
SH 49 139 0 8364 0.992 t¯ = 240.06 σ = 0.07
NG 50 4242 0 4261 0.751 t¯ = 38.77 σ = 55.31
ICSI
SL 49 185 0 378 0.836 t¯ = 174.84 σ = 34.78
SH 49 64 0 499 0.943 t¯ = 240.06 σ = 0.07
NG 50 349 0 214 0.69 t¯ = 38.77 σ = 55.31
PDU
N
SUEE8
SL 49 1884 0 6619 0.889 t¯ = 46.09 σ = 37.79
SH 49 3502 0 5001 0.794 t¯ = 105.63 σ = 42.73
NG 50 538 0 7965 0.968 t¯ = 12.22 σ = 14.01
ICSI
SL 49 278 0 285 0.753 t¯ = 46.09 σ = 37.79
SH 49 396 0 167 0.648 t¯ = 105.63 σ = 42.73
NG 50 212 0 351 0.812 t¯ = 12.21 σ = 14.01
Y
SUEE8
SL 49 4021 0 4482 0.764 t¯ = 5.94 σ = 33.78
SH 49 3407 0 5096 0.8 t¯ = 5.88 σ = 6.69
NG 49 3407 1 5096 0.79 t¯ = 1.56 σ = 1.49
ICSI
SL 49 380 0 183 0.663 t¯ = 5.94 σ = 33.78
SH 49 352 0 211 0.687 t¯ = 5.88 σ = 6.69
NG 49 352 1 211 0.677 t¯ = 1.56 σ = 1.49
LPR-
PDU
N
SUEE8
SL 49 217 0 8286 0.987 t¯ = 211.26 σ = 28.65
SH 49 197 0 8306 0.988 t¯ = 210.21 σ = 0.01
NG 50 315 0 8188 0.981 t¯ = 55.85 σ = 50.06
ICSI
SL 49 102 0 461 0.909 t¯ = 211.26 σ = 28.65
SH 49 86 0 477 0.924 t¯ = 210.21 σ = 0.01
NG 50 164 0 399 0.854 t¯ = 55.85 σ = 50.06
Y
SUEE8
SL 49 471 0 8032 0.972 t¯ = 176.36 σ = 35.93
SH 49 88 0 8415 0.995 t¯ = 240.06 σ = 0.07
NG 50 1509 0 6994 0.911 t¯ = 39.21 σ = 55.03
ICSI
SL 49 134 0 429 0.881 t¯ = 176.36 σ = 35.93
SH 49 33 0 530 0.971 t¯ = 240.01 σ = 0.07
NG 50 270 0 293 0.76 t¯ = 39.21 σ = 55.03
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Table 5. Evaluation results for LPR-PDU when for each partial scheme the maximum
threshold is chosen (bold values in Table 2).
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N
SUEE8
SL 49 1261 0 7242 0.926 t¯ = 20.35 σ = 11.28
SH 49 1261 0 7242 0.926 t¯ = 107.47 σ = 38.59
NG 50 1261 0 7242 0.926 t¯ = 52.87 σ = 51.39
ICSI
SL 49 277 0 286 0.754 t¯ = 20.35 σ = 11.28
SH 49 277 0 286 0.754 t¯ = 107.47 σ = 38.59
NG 50 277 0 286 0.754 t¯ = 52.87 σ = 51.39
Y
SUEE8
SL 49 1603 0 6900 0.906 t¯ = 14.83 σ = 33.02
SH 49 1603 0 6900 0.906 t¯ = 13.05 σ = 7.75
NG 50 1603 0 6900 0.906 t¯ = 39.21 σ = 55.03
ICSI
SL 49 272 0 291 0.758 t¯ = 14.83 σ = 33.02
SH 49 272 0 291 0.758 t¯ = 13.05 σ = 7.75
NG 50 272 0 291 0.758 t¯ = 39.21 σ = 55.03
clients. We again use the balanced accuracy to assess the quality of the scheme
but report all false/true positive and false/true negative values as well. Fur-
thermore, another very important aspect is the detection time, i.e. the mean
time each attacker remains undetected. Slow attacks work by opening as many
connections as possible and keeping them open as long as possible to ensure
maximum impact. If all attackers can be identified correctly but the detection
time is too high, the attack might still be successful. It might even be worth
trading accuracy for lower detection times if necessary.
Table 3 shows the results for the long connection scheme (LC), the low mean
packet rate scheme (MPR) and the low packet rate variance scheme (PRV).
LC can be used to detect slowhttptest fast with a highly varying false positive
rate between 3.4% and 58%. It cannot be used to detect the other attacks. For
slowloris-ng, it behaves on the same level as a coin toss. MPR and PRV show
similar results. They can detect slowhttptest but are close to useless for the
other attacks. For these three schemes, the TCP handshake has to be taken into
account.
Table 4 contains our results for the schemes low packet rate (LPR), packet
distance uniformity (PDU), and the combination of both schemes. The results
show, that all metrics can be used to detect attacks (except for rare cases, all
attackers were found), however, the false positive rate varies significantly.
Low packet rate is a good classifier for the basic attacks slowloris and
slowhttptest with a balanced accuracy of 0.96 to 0.98 for the SUEE8 data set.
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However, detection times of up to 210 seconds per client have to be considered.
Packet distance uniformity is much faster but also less reliable than LPR for
the basic attacks, it performs better than PTR when faced with the improved
slowloris-ng attack. The combination of the aforementioned schemes shows much
better results than the two schemes each alone. With a balanced accuracy be-
tween 0.854 (untrained data set) and 0.987 (trained data set) without TCP
handshake and 0.76 (untrained data set) to 0.995 (trained data set) with TCP
handshake, this method proves to be the most reliable scheme. However, as a
combined method, it also inherits the high detection time of LPR with the best
threshold pairs for each attack.
Up to here, we evaluated whether the schemes can work with the right thresh-
olds for each attack. However, when defending a real network we do not know
which attack the attacker will choose. For the most promising schemes (LPR,
PDU, and LPR-PDU) we therefore also evaluated how these schemes hold up
when the threshold is not the ideal one for these attacks.
Figure 2 shows extended balanced accuracy results for LPR, PDU, and LPR-
PDU. For each threshold (or threshold pair) the diagrams show how good the
classifiers are identifying the attackers in all three attacks. For LPR in the top two
graphs, it can be seen that the best threshold for slowloris also works well against
slowhttptest (with the same detection rate). The best threshold for slowhttptest,
however, is unusable both for slowloris and slowloris-ng. As slowloris-ng has a
higher packet rate than the other two attacks, their ideal threshold is much
higher. This means more false positives and therefore a lower balanced accuracy
for all schemes. However, all attackers were detected reliably with this threshold.
For the packet distance uniformity scheme, when not taking the TCP hand-
shake into account, the best threshold for slowloris also shows the same results
for slowloris-ng. However, for slowhttptest, this value is unusable. In turn, the
best threshold for slowloris-ng is unusable for the other two schemes. A packet
distance of 0.000631s as the highest value results in more false positives than
the other values but results in a true positive rate of 100% for all attacks. When
we include the TCP handshake, slowhttptest and slowloris-ng work best with
the same threshold which is not usable for slowloris while the slowloris threshold
results in a high false positive rate for all attacks.
The combined scheme is evaluated with four different threshold pairs: The
best pair for each attack and the maximum threshold values for each of these
pairs. The best thresholds for the three attacks show, that this scheme works very
well in detecting each attack (with a balanced accuracy of up to 0.995). However,
each of these threshold pairs results in very bad detection rates for the other
attacks. Combining the maximum thresholds of each partial scheme, however,
results in a good balanced accuracy of up to 0.926 without TCP handshake or
0.906 with TCP handshake for all attacks equally. The detection times of 13 to
39 seconds also are much better than the ideal thresholds for each attack.
For all these evaluations one suspicious packet is enough to deem a client an
attacker. For the SUEE8 data set, this means that a client has to send only one
suspicious packet in more than one week. The accuracy can be improved when
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(TCP handshakes excluded) (TCP handshakes included)
Low packet rate (LPR).
threshold in Hz threshold in Hz
Packet distance uniformity (PDU).
threshold in s threshold in s
Combination of low packet rate and packet distance uniformity (LPR-PDU).
thresholds in [Hz, s] thresholds in [Hz, s]
ICSI
SUEE8
slowloris slowhttptest slowloris-ng
Fig. 2. Balanced accuracy for LPR, PDU, and LPR-PDU (top to bottom) without
TCP handshake and with TCP handshake (left to right). Each with the best thresholds
for slowloris, slowhttptest, and slowloris-ng (left to right) and for LPR-PDU addition-
ally the results when for each partial scheme threshold the maximum value of the three
is used.
18 Thomas Lukaseder et al.
Fig. 3. Evaluation results for balanced accuracy (left) and detection times (right) for
LPR without TCP handshake on SUEE8 dependent on strikes (p=0.77687Hz). More
strikes result in a higher balanced accuracy but also much higher detection times.
several strikes, i.e. suspicious packets are necessary for an attacker classification.
We conducted all tests with one, two, three, and four strikes. As an example,
Figure 3 shows our results for low packet rate without TCP handshake and a
fixed threshold of 0.77687Hz for all measurements. The left figure shows, that
the balanced accuracy can be improved when the amount of strikes necessary
for a detection is increased. However, as can be seen in the right figure, this
extends the detection time extensively, from a mean of 16 seconds to 61 seconds
for slowloris, from 12 seconds to 86 seconds for slowhttptest, and from 53 to
67 seconds for slowloris-ng, this means a 281%, 616% and 26% increase in de-
tection time. Therefore, the comparably low increase in accuracy does result in
impractical detection times.
4.4 Discussion
In line with our expectations, the schemes provide better results for the SUEE8
data set compared to the results of the ICSI data set. This is because the identifi-
cation thresholds were determined using training data more similar to the former
load. This might indicate the importance of taking the actual deployment net-
work into account, further tests need to be conducted to come to a definitive
conclusion. The evaluation shows varying results for the different schemes. In
general, LC, MPR, and PRV are only able to detect slowhttptest. The TCP
handshakes have to be taken into account when using these schemes. LC is both
more accurate and faster than the other two. LPR, PDU, and the combined
scheme LPR-PDU show much more potential. The best results in our mea-
surements are achieved with LPR-PDU while also including TCP handshakes.
We reached a balanced accuracy of 0.992 when using this scheme. The varying
threshold values per attack introduce additional complexity for successful de-
fenses. We recommend less aggressive thresholds that detect simpler attacks as
a default, and then dynamically ramp up to more aggressive thresholds in case
the initial mitigation is not successful.
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5 Conclusion
Slow HTTP attacks differ quite a bit from flooding attacks and their identi-
fication and mitigation can lead to a high management effort of the network
infrastructure. We developed several concepts based on light-weight flow-based
analysis of network traffic that can identify attackers and help to exclude them
from the network. Our analyses showed that a network-based defense approach
against slow attacks is actually feasible and should be considered as part of a
defense strategy for network providers. The accuracy of the schemes is not high
enough to leave the system active all the time but it is very effective as part of
a reactive defense system once ongoing attacks have been identified. The attack
tools we used are only able to conduct attacks based on the HTTP protocol.
However, as we did not use any scheme that is dependent on application layer
data, our mechanisms should also be able to protect other TCP-based applica-
tion layer protocols that are vulnerable to slow attacks.
Except for the number of strikes, where we also considered the detection
time, we choose the best scheme and threshold solely based on the balanced
accuracy. However, the detection time should be considered as well. For future
work, we would like to implement a system, that can dynamically alter thresholds
based on the current network data to increase robustness and adaptiveness of
the system. With slow HTTP attacks, we are faced with the necessity to analyze
large amounts of online traffic data efficiently. Detection time and accuracy of
the mitigation system are in sharp contrast to each other and the right middle
ground needs to be found. Therefore, for future work, we also plan to deepen
our analysis concerning this compromise.
In this work, we also introduced slowloris-ng, a more sophisticated attack
tool that is harder to detect by network operators due to its more randomized
behavior. The effectiveness of attack tools for slow DDoS attacks relies on using
a lot less resources than the system under attack. Slowloris-ng does require
slightly more resources than slowloris for the same attack effectiveness (given
no mitigation system is present) as the predictability of slowloris stems from its
implementation optimized for highest impact. A formal analysis of the trade-off
between attack effectiveness and detectability will be one of our next steps.
As part of our analysis, we compiled a new data set based on real-world
traffic traces of one and eight days of benign traffic combined with attack traffic
of three different attacks, marked in the data sets by their IP addresses. The
data sets include traffic from nearly 10,000 unique IP addresses. We hope that
by making these data sets publicly available without any restrictions, we can
help others to both replicate our results and to enable the development of more
efficient slow DDoS attack detectors.
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